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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Charles E. Stinnett appeals from 
the denial of his petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant filed his petition for a writ of 
Habeas Corpus in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County. A pre-
trial hearing was held on October 7th, 1966, before 
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the Honorable A.H. Ellett, judge presiding. The trial 
court denied appellant's petition for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits the decision of the trial 
should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 10, 1955, appellant entered a 
plea of guilty to a charge of robbery, and was sen-
tenced to the Utah State Prison for the term provided 
by law. It is appellant's claim in his petition for a writ 
of Habeas Corpus that certain constitutional rights 
were denied him prior to his entry of a plea of• 
guilty. Appellant's petition for a writ of Habeas Cor-
pus was filed on the 19th day of September, 1966. 
(R. 19). Gerald G. Gundry of the Salt Lake Legal De-
fenders Association was appointed to represent the 
appellant at the pretrial hearing. The matter came on 
for hearing on the 7th of October, 1966, the court re-
ceived testimony from Aldon J. Anderson on Octob-
er 24, 1966 (R. 25, 29). An order denying the petition 
for a writ of Habeas Corpus was entered on Oc-
tober 28, 1966. Other pertinent facts will be men-
tioned on the argument portion of this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RECORD AT THE PRETRIAL HEARING DIS-
CLOSES NO EVIDENCE THAT THE COURT WAS 
PREJUDICED AGAINST THE APPELLANT. 
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Appellant in his brief apparently argues that 
certain of the statements between the court and re-
spondent counsel were prejudicial to him. On a 
careful reading and subsequent re-reading of the 
transcribed testimony respondent finds no evidence 
of a bias or prejudice toward appellant by the court. 
To support his argument of prejudice, appellant 
cites the following language: 
"THE COURT: All right then I will deny his writ 
if Anderson files an affidavit denying that any such 
deals were made. If he admits it, the boy ought to be 
freed and remanded to the custody of the sheriff, 
and the district attorney can proceed to try him." 
(R. 27). 
Appellant cites in his brief only the first sentence in 
the above quoted statement. The statement itself is 
the summary as to what respective counsel had 
agreed with respect to corroborating an allegation 
made in appellant's petition. It was the opinion of 
the court and counsel on both sides at the pre-tria.l 
hearing that the only claim with even a trace 
of merit was that appellant had involuntarily en-
tered his plea of guilty. (R. 25). It is clear that if the 
district attorney had promised appellant that he 
would be granted probation in exchange for a plea 
of guilty then the writ should have issued. On 
the date on which appellant entered his plea of 
guilty the district attorney was the Honorable Aldon 
J. Anderson, now judge of the Third Judicial District 
of the State of Utah. In order to corroborate appel-
lant's claim, it was agreed that an affidavit from 
Judge Anderson would be sufficient. 
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In substance, all that was discussed at the pre-
trial hearing was the manner in which the only wit-
ness named in the petition would have his testi-
mony made a matter of the record. Throughout the 
transcript of that hearing there is no evidence that 
the court was biased or prejudiced against appel-
lant. On the contrary, the court was entirely fair 
and even vigorously attempted to secure testimony 
b support appellant's claim. 
"THE COURT: and if Aldon Anderson told him 
that [appellant would receive probation if he entered 
a plea of guilty] and persuaded him to enter a plea 
of guilty something should be done ... " (R. 26) 
Thus, it is clear the court fairly and without 
prejudice entertained appellant's contentions. 
POINT II 
COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL AT THE PRE-
TRIAL HEARING ADEQUATELY AND ETHICALLY 
REPRESENTED APPELLANT. 
From a careful reading of appellant's brief it 
appears that he complains about the following: 
(a) that counsel failed to research and subpoena wit-
nesses; (b) that counsel failed to call appellant to 
testify in his own behalf; (c) that counsel failed to 
inquire into the loss of an important exhibit. All 
these points appellant urges as evidence of coun-
sel's "negligence and incompetence." In the light 
of the record herein, such an allegation is unwar-
ranted, unsupported, irresponsible, and is a wholly 
unjustifiable attack on a competent and respected 
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member of the Utah State Bar. The answers to the 
points raised in appellant's second argument are 
very simple: first, counsel did not fail to research 
and subpoena witnesses because there were no 
witnesses other than Judge Anderson mentioned in 
appellant's petition. Counsel is not charged with 
knowledge of witnesses not mentioned in the peti-
tion. Harding v. Logan, 251 F. Supp. 710 (D. N.C. 
1966). Judge Anderson did, in fact, testify and his 
testimony was in direct conflict to appellant's claim 
(r. 29-30); secondly, no purpose would be served by 
hci.ving appellant testify in his own behalf since his 
sworn petition is accorded every bit as much weight 
as would be given his direct testimony. Long v. 
Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 720, 192 P.2d 169 (1948); thirdly, 
a transcript of the original proceedings was not 
necessary to his defense since taking all of the alle-
gations in the petition as true, the only one that 
would support the issuance of a writ of habeas 
corpus was the allegation that the district attorney 
had wrongly induced a plea of guilty. That allega-
tion was conclusively refuted by Judge Anderson's 
testimony. There is in the record no evidence that 
appellant's counsel was negligent or incompete:r..t 
in any way. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT FAIL TO CONSIDER EACH 
AND EVERY ALLEGATION IN APPELLANT'S PETI-
TION. 
Throughout his petition appellant repeatedly 
makes vague claims of a denial of his constitutionai 
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rights. It must be assumed that the trial court gave 
careful consideration and read appellant's petition 
in its entirety. Aside from his claim that his guiltv 
plea was involuntary, if we assume, as obviously 
the trial court in this case must have done, that 
everything in said petition was true, appellant has 
still presented no grounds for issuance of the writ 
of Habeas Corpus. Ramseur v. Blackwell, 361 F.2d 
123 (5th Cir. 1966); Smoake v. Willingham, 359 F.2d 
386 (10th Cir. 1966). Appellant apparently is arguing 
that the recent case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966), should apply to him. However, that Miran-
da does not have retroactive scope has been clearly 
stated in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (196e). 
"In this case we are called upon to determine wheth-
er Escobedo v. Illinois and Miranda v. Arizona should 
be applied retroactively. We hold that Escobedo af-
fects only those cases in which the trial began after 
June 22, 1964, the date of that decision. We hold 
further that Mirada applies only to cases in which 
the trial began after the date of our decision one 
week ago. The convictions assailed here were obtained 
at trials completed long before Escobedo and Miranda 
were rendered, and the ruling in those cases are there-
fore in applicable to the present proceeding." 
Thus, it is clear that the only meritorious argu-
ment presented in appellant's petition for writ of 
habeas corpus is that concerning the voluntariness 
of his plea as that issue is discussed in Point IV of 
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this brief. Therefore, the denial of appellant's peti-
tion is conclusive evidence that the court construed 
each possible argument in a manner most favorable 
to appellant and decided as a matter of law that none 
were sufficient to justify the issuance of the writ. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S PLEA OF - GUILTY WAS EN-
TERED FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY SINCE HE WAS 
ADVISED BY COMPETENT COUNSEL AT THE TIME 
OF ENTERING HIS PLEA; AND FURTHER, PETITION-
ER'S UNSUPPORTED AND UNCORROBORATED AL-
LEGATIONS OF COERCION WILL NOT SUPPORT THE 
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 
Although appellant makes many claims that he 
was deprived of certain constitutional rights in the 
original proceedings, in light of the record here 
presented, respondent submits that all of said 
claims are wholly without basis. Appellant was pro-
vided with court appointed counsel in the original 
prosecution for robbery, and in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, it must be assumed that he 
was represented adequately. (R. 17). His counsel at 
the time was and is a highly respected member of 
the Utah State Bar. Consequently it must be as-
sumed that appellant was fully aware of his rights 
at the time of entering his plea. Burge v. State, 
90 Idaho 473, 413 P.2d 451 (1966). 
It is evident from the discussion in the trial court 
that all parties were agreed that had the district at-
torney made promises to the defendant to the effect 
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that there would be probation if he would plead 
guilty, then this would surely require a Habeas 
Corpus hearing. With this premise, the respondent 
is in agreement. Williams v. Swope. 186 F.2d 897 
(9th Cir. 1951). However, where the record refutes 
the claim that a guilty plea was not freely and know-
ingly entered, the court is correct in denying a hear-
ing. Webb v. Crouse. 359 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1966): 
Hicks v. Hand. 189 Kan. 415, 369 P.2d 250 (1962). It 
is not denied that were his allegations with respect 
to the statements made to him by the district attor-
ney true, he would have to be remanded for a nevr 
trial. Milewski v. Ashe. 362 Pa. 48, 66 A.2d 281 (1949). 
However, a trial court is not required to believe un-
supported testimony of a habeas corpus petitioner 
even though the respondent might not offer any 
evidence in contradiction. Ex Parte Farrell. 189 F.2d 
540 Ost Cir. 1951), Cert.Den., Farrell v. O'Brien. 342 
U.S. 839 ( 1951 ). In the case now before this court the 
trial court did not have only the petitioner's own 
statements, the court was afforded the opportunity 
to have the person who allegedly had made the 
promise to the petitioner testify to the matter. As a 
result, the claim of petitioner is clearly and emphatic-
ally contradicted. Absent some evidence to support 
this claim, a writ will not issue. Jackson v. San-
ford. 79 F. Supp. 74 (D. Ga. 1947), Ex Parte Matthews, 
85 Okla. Cr. 173, 186 P.2d 840 (1947); Blevins v. Huds-
peth. 166 Kan. 117, 199 P.2d 171 (1948). 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that all of the arguments in both 
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appellant's brief and petition for the writ of Habeas 
Corpus are without merit. They constitute a scurri-
lous and unfounded attack on the legal profession 
and its members. A careful reading of the entire 
record in this case merely convinces the respondent 
of the adequacy of the original proceedings and 
also those of the pretrial hearing on the petition. The 
appellant has been given every benefit; every con-
cession has been made for him; there is absolutely 
no evidence that he has been denied any rights 
protected by the constitution; no evidence that all 
efforts have not been made to guarantee appellant 
fair treatment. This appeal is without merit and the 
denial of the writ of Habeas Corpus should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
